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The Jet Propulsion Laboratory's
(JPL) Resource Allocation Process
incorporated the decision making software
system RALPH into the planning process
four years ago. The current principal task of
the Resource Allocation Process includes the
planning and apportionment of JPL's
Ground Data System composed of the Deep
Space Network and Mission Control and
Computing Center facilities. The addition
of the data-driven, rule-based planning
system, RALPH, has expanded the planning
horizon from eight weeks to ten years and
has resulted in significant labor savings.
Use of the system has also resulted in
important improvements in science return
through enhanced resource utilization. In
addition, RALPH has been instrumental in
supporting rapM turn around for an
increased volume of special "what if"
studies.
This paper briefly reviews the status
of RALPH and focuses on important
lessons learned from the creation of an
highly functional design team, through an
evolutionary design and implementation
period in which we selected, prototyped and
ultimately abandoned an 'AI' shell, and
through the fundamental changes to the very
process that spawned the tool kit. Principal
topics include proper integration of software
tools within the planning environment,
transition from prototype to delivered
software, changes in the planning
methodology as a result of evolving software
capabilities and creation of the ability to
develop and process generic requirements to
allow planning flexibility.
Also examined are strengthening of
resource allocation techniques enabling
implementation of effective conflict
resolution strategies through an
understanding of mission flexibility in the
context of resource capacity/availability,
characteristics and constraints, and
techniques enabling early forecasting of
resource loading to permit mission design
changes. Finally, we present a discussion of
a design which provides the ability to easily
alter resource and requirements data tree
structures to provide a problem-independent
scheduling system applicable to a wide range
of scheduling problems.
INTRODUCTION
During the last four years, the
Resource Allocation Planning Helper
(RALPH) has become an integral part of
the Ground Data System Resource
Allocation Process (RAP) at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. (see Figure 1) As
a result of the experience of users from
the flight projects, the Resource Analysis
Team and ground-based radio astronomy,
both the process and the RALPH tool kit
have begun to change and mature. 1 The
experiences gained during this period of
transition have provided some interesting
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insights of benefit to those involved in the
creation of similar systems.
RALPH has enabled the JPL
Resource Analysis Team to extend its
planning horizon from the three weeks
common in the mid-1980s to ten years. In
doing so, it provides a valuable planning
tool for ground-based radio astronomy,
mission and sequence designers of current
unmanned deep space and planetary
projects, and planners of future projects.
Providing the ability to quickly derive
answers to 'what-if' questions posed by
JPL and NASA management, RALPH has
proven to be a unique and worthwhile
resource.
This paper presents a discussion of
the transitions that have occurred during
an evolutionary design and
implementation cycle.
COHESIVE DESIGN TEAM
From the inception of the project
in 1985, a relatively small group of
developers and users have worked
cooperatively toward an illusive goal.
Though from different organizations
within the JPL matrix, developers and
users have built a working relationship
based on constant personal
communication. To the team, this has
meant that formal weekly design meetings
are reinforced by daily informal sharing of
progress, frustrations, an ever-expanding
user wish list, triumphs and failures.
Through the first three years of
design and prototyping, purely through an
accident of logistics, the teams inhabited
the same building, separated only by a
flight of stairs. This providential co-
location was of tremendous importance to
the ultimate success of the project. The
development team participated in the
'hands-on' production of planning products
during this period, and through these
efforts were able to both confirm what




A fortuitous decision in the early
stages of RALPH design was that to build
a true expert system. As will be explained
later, that decision was altered in stages as
the design matured, but the effort by
development to understand the Planning
Methodology was already underway.
Planning is not scheduling; though
the end result may well be a schedule, it
requires a unique mind-set that does not
come easily to some. A plan may be
differentiated from a schedule by the
process of its creation. Typically, a
planner has much more to consider than
simply how to fit some irregular pieces
together to force them into a confined
space. Rather, he must juggle the
complexities of intertwined impacts that
his decisions may have on the entities
being scheduled. A prime example is that
Resource Allocation Team plans
(schedules) have as their principal aims:
(1) the maximizing of science return from
each of the spacecraft being tracked, (2)
optimization of resource use, and (3)
spacecraft health/survival.
The need to understand the
planning mind-set became apparent during
the earliest stages of the Design Team's
work, and, as a result, the developers
virtually 'moved in' with the users. Due
to the close proximity of our offices,
members of the development team had
begun to spend virtually all of their time
working with the planners. Though much
of their activity was typical of the
information gathering stages of Knowledge
Engineering, their involvement with the
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Resource Allocation Team was total. At
least two developers have acquired the
skills of apprentice planners.
The result of this extended task has
been a design that is intuitive, generic and
flexible. RALPH is optimized to attack
some very specific problems revolving
around identification and management of
resource conflicts at Deep Space Network
(DSN) stations, but has already shown its
ability to solve problems not specifically
foreseen by the Design Team. As they
acquired the planning mind-set, the
development team began to realize that
the solution to the primary problem, if
properly implemented, could be applied
readily to other resource scheduling
situations.
One of the most commonly applied
results is the capability to do 'what if'
special studies for a variety of users. To
date, those activities have included an
analysis of the potential impact of NASA
access to a proposed Centre National
d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) 34 meter
tracking station on Tahiti, an impact study
on proposed DSN support for Phobos and
a DSN study to examine the cost-
effectiveness of acquiring some additional
hardware to minimize station downtime
during equipment upgrades. The Phobos
study was of some interest because, as a
result of its findings, Phobos Project
management altered the landing date of
Lander #2 and adopted a co-location
scenario for the landers. The addition of
RALPH support has enabled the team to
produce one or two special studies each
month as a complement to the regular
work load.
Each of these, and other studies,
have been possible because the design
offers nearly unlimited flexibility that
allows the planner to describe virtually
any set of resource capabilities and user
requirements.
A LITI'LE LANGUAGE FOR DATA
TREE MANIPULATION
Prototyping the necessary
Requirements and Resources data
management techniques had proven the
value of specialized tree structures to the
development team. It became apparent,
though, that without resorting to the use
of proprietary software with some
unacceptable limits, manipulation of data
objects required a great deal of coding.
The decision to create a little language to
manage operations within the RALPH
database has proven to have been the
correct path.
Implemented in C, the resulting
Tree Manipulation Base Routines
(TMBR) has provided sufficient power
and flexibility that approximately half of
the RALPH executables are written in
TMBR. The remaining code is C.
The tree structures are central to
the final RALPH design. Schedules are
appended to the lowest levels of the
Resource Capabilities trees as they are
created. The text and graphics editors,
printer and plotter routines and display
drivers all access schedules and user
requirements via TMBR commands.
Schedule changes following negotiating
sessions alter the data structures via
TMBR.
CART BEFORE HORSE
When the Resource Allocation
Team first identified the need for software
support, it seemed apparent that the
conditions necessitated a schedule
optimizer. The planning staff had spent
years putting together schedules manually,
but the capability to create a final product
that provided the maximum possible
support for all users while minimizing
negative impacts was very time-consuming.
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The inability to identify and evaluate all
alternatives had precluded true planning
beyond three to eight weeks. Even within
this time frame it was difficult, if not
impossible, to react in real time to
changes in user requirements (science
opportunities such as unexpected solar
activity or the recent super nova) and
facility capabilities (last winter's
inopportune loss of the 70m station at
Madrid during a period of already heavy
contention).
As design work was begun, it
became apparent to the team that
concentrating on the optimizer would be
a tactical error. The resource allocation
process would be better served by a tool
that could build the schedule from scratch.
Optimization, though guided by the
planners, had always been a people
process, decision making by consensus of
representatives of all involved projects.
Totally removing the users from the loop
would be politically inadvisable.
With the realization that the
planner logically had to be done first, the
team once more began looking at
required functionality. Focus was initially
on implementing what we had learned
about the planning process, but once
again, it was realized that we had not
reached the-illusive 'square one'. Our
planners work was being driven by written
requirements levied by users. The
planning software would require some sort
of interface through which requirements
could be input.
The requirements translator, which
interprets and reformats user inputs,
revealed itself to be a task of a complexity
equal to that of the planner. The
translator must accept widely varied input
in the form of user requirements and
synthesize a uniform list of times,
durations, antenna designations and split
coverage with tracks to support uplink and
downlink for distant spacecraft that the
planner can overlay on a timeline.
Parsing the input file and creating a
common format from requirements which
may be totally generic (14 hours of
tracking on 34m stations during the next
seven days), science priority specific,
spacecraft or mission event-driven, or
innumerable combinations is more time
and resource consuming than creating a
plan. (see Figure 2)
Another pivotal innovation that has
made the system such a valuable tool was
the concept of Generic Requirements.
Building a schedule is a series of
controlled, rule-based reactions to
requirements imposed by the participants.
Each scheduling exercise calls for
thousands of individual decisions and has
thousands of potential solutions. As in a
game, the complexity increases
geometrically with the number of rules. If
projects could be convinced that there
were advantages to loosening or
reformatting their tracking requirements,
or reducing the number of rules in the
game, the planner, whether man or
machine, would have many more options
and could ultimately create a better plan.
That campaign has been won.
RALPH was implemented with the ability
to interpret inputs and build plans
whether driven by specific or generic
requirements, but the user projects,
realizing the positive impact of generic
requirements use them for all tracking
except that supporting project-critical
events such as encounters and maneuvers.
The goal, then, was to create a
requirements translator/planner/optimizer
to provide the conflict resolution process
a solid starting point. This is not to
minimize the quality of RALPH plans for,
starting with the highest priority









































the multitude of possibilities the 'best'
option. And, though the planner can be
forced to produce a conflict-free product,
as we have previously discussed, we
believe that the committee of project
representatives should resolve the most
difficult conflicts though consensus
decisions.
HOW FAR SHOULD AUTOMATION
GO?
When the RALPH tool kit was
originally conceived, one of the ultimate
goals was to determine the appropriate
mix of decision making by software and by
humans. However, resource allocation is
a very complex function the result of
which ultimately determines or, at least
strongly influences, the volume and mix of
science and engineering data to be
returned from each spacecraft. The
science investigation teams for each
project could make a valid case for
increasing the amount of coverage granted
their spacecraft or ground-based activity.
For these reasons, and for those we have
discussed elsewhere, the final steps in
making tracking decisions is, and will
continue to be, made by a team of project
representatives working with Resource
Analysis Team planners.
Human nature, then, is an
undeniable obstacle standing in the way of
a totally automated planner. With the
adoption of generic requirements and with
RALPH's event priority logic delivered,
there is no technical reason that a set of
rules could not be assembled that would
allow the software to create a conflict-free
schedule.
If total automation were a goal, a
second impediment, one that would have
to be overcome by careful design, would
be the need for a comprehensive rule set
defining the relationship and priorities
between every combination of supported
projects and a second set defining every
potential contingency that might alter the
requirements of each project. In planning,
decision making must take into account
the present situation, but must often also
consider inter-project trade-offs used
recently in granting (or withholding)
support.
A planner may, for example, deny
Voyager 1 several hours of tracking time
during a specific week in favor of ICE,
but often does so with at least the
informal understanding that that time will
be 'repaid' when the total tracking
situation allows it. Any such trade-off,
including the intention to do a payback, is
always driven by the ultimate goal of
maximizing science return for all
supported projects. Any fully automated
system would have to be capable of
similar decision making to be acceptable.
START-UP LAG
Valid statistics demonstrating the
cost-effectiveness of the RALPH
development effort have been compiled
and advertised. At the same time, we
have recently been overwhelmed by more
than normal negotiating time, one of the
specific problems that RALPH was built
to minimize. We have been able to
demonstrate that both the process and the
tool are valid and are functioning as
designed. We are, however, victims of
uncontrollable past circumstances.
Had the capability to do long-range
planning existed in the early 1980s, JPL
and NASA would have had a tool to
permit optimized re-scheduling of
payloads when shuttle flights resumed
following the post-Challenger hiatus.
Long-term planning completed before the
Challenger accident had scheduled most
upcoming launches, encounters and other
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tracking-intensive events to minimize
serious conflicts.
With the resumption of STS-based
planetary launches, however, the schedule
for the late 1980s and early 1990s has
become anything but optimal. Magellan
(MGN) and Galileo (GLL) were launched
sex months apart with mission designs
vastly different than those originally
planned. As a result, both are headed for
Venus and periodically have very similar
view periods (that is, occupy the same
part of the sky from an Earth
perspective). Sharing significant parts of
the same sector of the sky are two of the
Pioneer spacecraft. As GLL approaches
Venus for a fly-by and concurrent
trajectory correction, planners are faced
with providing Galileo nearly continual
coverage while providing at least survival
coverage for MGN and the Pioneers.
This is just the situation planning is
designed to avoid.
Software projects implemented to
correct or improve an on-going situation
should provide some strategy to go back
and correct the short-comings of the past.
The danger is that sponsor confidence can
be badly damaged unless the development
organization is able to foresee start-up
deficiencies and make them known to
management.
The RALPH Design Team had
anticipated this 'lag' to some extent and,
consequently had taken steps to prepare
management. Two additional problems
prevented a totally adequate reaction to
the coming situation. First, when launches
resumed, there was not sufficient lead
time to allow flight projects and mission
planners to react properly. In addition,
these events occurred at a time when
Resource Allocation Plans were new to
project management and the plan's
credibility had to be established before
any reaction could be mounted.
When plans with enormous levels
of antenna contention began to appear,
the negotiating process reacted by slowing
down from the excessive work load. It
appeared at first that neither the software
nor the resource allocation process were
working when, in reality, the quality of
both was absolutely valid under the
circumstances. What was required was a
doubling and re-doubling of negotiating
time until the most difficult periods had
been freed of conflicts.
COST EFFECTIVENESS
While Resource Analysis Team
benefits of the RALPH tool kit and
planning products produced through its
use are easily measured, a significant
portion of its positive impact per dollar
invested cannot be estimated with any
degree of accuracy. The latter is largely
because RALPH provides long-range
planning capabilities not available in the
past from any source. The semi-annual
mid and long-range plans as well as
special studies, done largely by special
request and with quick turn-around, have
become working tools for near term
decision making and long-range planning
by JPL management and NASA
Headquarters.
A significant side benefit of
RALPH is its support of RAT team
activities including data entry, plan
generation, and conflict resolution meeting
support. The 1988 estimated savings was
well over 7000 person-hours a year. A
significant part of this is the fact that
preparation of weekly plans historically
required 25 hours of an experienced
planner's time. Now, a RALPH planner
with far less experience can produce a
plan in five hours, most of which is
consumed by data entry.
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The editors and plotting routines
make possible the production of
diagnostic tools never before available.
The majority of the 7000 hours, though, is
reflected in the fact that the mature state
of RALPH allocation plans has reduced
the number of negotiating sessions to only
one weekly from the former three or four.
This reduction is worth well over 6000
hours yearly. The RALPH four year
development costs have been about $3
million.
HYBRID ARCHITECTURE
As a design incorporating heavy
reliance on data tree structures emerged,
the designers realized that any attempt to
continue to rely wholly on the original
expert system concept was invalid.
Rather, conventional algorithmic
structures could be used for much of the
planning as well the supporting editors,
input/output and interpretive modules.
The RALPH design continues to
rely on rule-based decision making for
such tasks as creating best fit schedules
and, at a more detailed level, making
support decisions based on sets of
contention variables. Each of the TMBR
modules, then, has been designed either
as a rule-based routine or as a traditional
algorithm.
PAINFUL TRANSITIONS
To have the opportunity to even
begin an innovative task requires equal
doses of optimism and masochism,
innovation and conservatism. In a large
organization, it also requires management
with the foresight to charge an enemy
hidden in the mists of uncertainty.
Innovation can make you seem a genius
or a fool. Innovation is an arena for
those who understand that not every
attempt is a win, but who believe that the
goal is worthy and the aspirants are equal
to the test.
RALPH development has been
treated somewhat differently than many
software prototypes. Whereas the
prototyping environment is most often
laboratory-like, isolated from the
atmosphere of real world production,
RALPH has been an 'on-line prototype'
from its first delivery in 1986. We have
found this to be an optimal state offering
the users the latest available technology
while at the same time allowing quick
turn-around when delivering new features
or bug fixes.
Daily use of advanced prototypes
also offers the developer a realistic
perspective of the true usefulness of his
creation. Isolated prototyping, if not
carefully designed, can mask the behavior
of subject software under the hands of
perhaps less sophisticated users who can
usually be counted on to do the
unexpected in the course of meeting daily
production goals.
Throughout the prototyping period,
the status of the software, and of its
relationship to the process it supported,
was under constant peer review. That
feedback continues today through both
formal and informal feedback from the
user community and the RALPH review
board.
During four years of on-line
prototyping, current configurations on
development and production machines
had been managed by knowledgeable
members of the design team. The
sponsoring organization, JPL's Flight
Project Support Office (FPSO),
determined that RALPH had achieved a
state of maturity that demanded the end
of informal deliveries and consequent
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introduction of formal configuration
management (CM).
Though neither users nor
developers foresaw this as a problem, we
learned over the next two or three months
that two distinct philosophies existed. The
design team assumed an indeterminate
transition period controlled largely by the
relative ease of the version 4.0 delivery.
This delivery followed a major rewrite
during the transition from RALPH's early
format to the previously described
TMBR/C version, a non-trivial
metamorphosis. Configuration
Management had assumed a transition day
to occur before delivery to test. The
acceptance test period was extensive and
required several re-deliveries. Ultimately,
it was evident to all that a transitional
period had occurred naturally and that
formal, third party CM was applicable
only after true stability of the final
prototype version had been achieved.
WHERE WILL IT END?
References have been made to the
mid-course corrections that have been
necessary to refine the design team's
targeting. The result is that, to date, a
tool set with enormous positive impact
has been created for the users. Through
use of the growing set of tools, both the
Resources Analysis Team and the projects
they support have conceived an extensive
list of additional capabilities that would
expand the team's abilities even further.
Not the least of these is the
suggestion that, in the coming era of
growing international cooperation and
sharing of resources, 2 the JPL resource
allocation process and the RALPH tool
kit would be an ideal means to provide
optimized planning and scheduling for the
world space science community. The
Phobos and CNES studies mentioned
earlier, as well as support for such
multinational efforts as Ulysses, Giotto
and Galileo, have provided valuable
experience in international cooperation.
CONCLUSION
The RALPH experience has
emphasized a number of lessons which,
while not unique to this effort, will have
been of benefit as we embark on future
projects. Tantamount to a secure
development environment is a sponsor
who understands the risks and potential
benefits and is willing to support
development through both good and bad
times. During development, success of a
unique system is highly dependent on a
close and lasting relationship between
developers and users. Such a
circumstance is a virtual guarantee that
delivery will be free of misgivings and
disappointment.
An expert system is traditionally
design to replace an expert. The goal of
RALPH implementation has been to
relieve the 'front end' burden of tedious
scheduling from the expert planner and to
move him to the 'back end' of the system
where his expertise can be concentrated
on analysis and on providing
recommendations prior to negotiations.
In the creation of a precedent-
setting system, it is vital for the developers
to take unusual strides to be assured that
they understand the full implications of
the user's requirements. The system
initially conceived and requested by users
may not be the solution to his problems,
for, as we have experienced, the
methodology may change in response to
the power of the tool. Proceed with
caution, be flexible and schedule
deliveries that assume change. Regardless
of the care given to the original design
decisions, significant changes are likely
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when the methods chosen break new
ground. And, finally, plan a lengthy
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